What does it mean that Mohamed Morsi is president of Egypt? Speaking for the American consensus, Bret Stephens  recently argued in the Wall Street Journal against the consolation that the Muslim Brotherhood’s victory “is merely symbolic, since the army still has the guns.” He concluded that “Egypt is lost.”
We shall argue to the contrary: the election was not just symbolic but illusory, and Egypt’s future remains very much in play.
Morsi is not the most powerful politician in Egypt or the commander in chief. Arguably, he does not even run the Muslim Brotherhood. His job is undefined. The military could brush him aside. For the first time since 1954, Egypt’s president is a secondary figure, assigned the functionary role long associated with its prime ministers.
Mohamed Tantawi is the real ruler of Egypt. Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), Field Marshall, and Minister of Defense, he serves not only as the commander in chief but also as effective head of all three Egypt’s governmental branches. Tantawi is an autocrat with near-absolute powers. As chief representative of the military junta that has been ruling Egypt since February 2011, his mission is to extend the junta’s rule indefinitely into the future, thereby assuring officers their perquisites and privileges.
SCAF exploits the Muslim Brotherhood and other proxies as its civilian fronts, a role they are happy to play, by permitting Islamists to garner an outsized percentage of the parliamentary vote, then to win the presidency. During the suspicious week-long delay before the presidential votes were announced, SCAF met  with the Muslim Brotherhood’s real leader, Khairat El-Shater, and reached a deal whereby Morsi became president but SCAF still governs.
To understand SCAF’s power, note three actions it took in conjunction with the presidential elections:
Imposition of martial law: On June 13, the Justice Minister  authorized the General Intelligence Services and military police to arrest civilians at will and incarcerate them for six months  if they express any form of written or artist opposition against SCAF, the police, or their Islamist proxies, while protesting these same institutions on the streets can lead to life in prison.
Dissolution of parliament: On the grounds that the parliamentary elections of Nov. 2011-Jan. 2012, breached the constitution (which prohibits party candidates to run for “individual” seats), the Supreme Administrative Court ruled them invalid in February 2012. On June 14, the SCAF-controlled Supreme Constitutional Court confirmed this decision and dissolved parliament. In retrospect, it appears that SCAF, which oversaw those elections, intentionally allowed Islamists to break the law so as to have an excuse  at will to dissolve Egypt’s fraudulent  parliament.
Establish the premise for martial law: SCAF issued a constitutional declaration  on June 17 that formalized its intention to prolong the military’s 60-year-old rule. Article 53/2 states that, in the face of internal unrest, “the president can issue a decision to direct the armed forces – with the approval of SCAF – to maintain security and defend public properties.” The basis for a complete military takeover could hardly be more baldly asserted; Morsi’s plan to reconvene the dissolved parliament  could justify such an action.
If foreigners are largely blind to SCAF’s power play, Egyptians widely recognize  this reality. The liberal April 6 Youth Movement  called its recent actions “a soft coup d’état.” Journalist Zainab Abu El-Magd  bitterly noted that “political coups these days are done through ‘fair elections’.” Ziad Abdel Tawab of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies  calls the dissolution of parliament a “blatant military coup.” One Egyptian newspaper  called Morsi “president without powers,” while an Islamist  compared him to Queen Elizabeth II of Britain.
SCAF is struggling to perpetuate the status quo , whereby the officer corps enjoys the good life and the rest of the country serves its needs. Making Morsi the apparent president of Egypt cleverly saddles him with responsibility as the country’s economic problems  worsen. But SCAF’s tricks run great dangers and could backfire, for a population fed up with tyranny and backwardness finds itself with more of the same. The next explosion could make the uprising of early 2011 look tame.
To help avoid that next explosion, Western governments should adopt a policy of pressuring SCAF gradually to permit increasing genuine political participation.
(© 2012 Daniel Pipes— original url: http://www.danielpipes.org/11584/mohamed-tantawi )